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Abstract  
We examine the effects on R&D of the assign-back provision in license contracts. 
When the technical scope of the assign-back is narrow, its expansion decreases 
investment in the improved technology, but increases that in the original technology. 
However, when the technical scope is larger than a certain threshold level, its expansion 
decreases the profit of the licensor of the original technology and reduces the 
investment in both technologies. Therefore, the licensor would not like to expand the 
technical scope beyond the threshold. In addition, we apply our result to the guidelines 
of Japan, the United -tates, and the European Union.    
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1.  Introduction   
A grant-back provision in license contracts means that a licensee is obliged to sell 
the patent of an improved technology to the licensor at an assigned price (an 
assign-back provision), or to not charge the licensor for the royalty of the improved 
technology (a free royalty provision), if the licensee succeeds in the improved technology 
by using the licensors’ patent. 
 
A grant-back provision has benefits and drawbacks. One of the benefits is that it 
provides a means for the licensee and the licensor to share the risks and to reward the 
licensor. On the other hand, the grant-back provision is considered to give monopolistic 
power to the licensor of the original technology, and it reduces the licensees’ incentives 
to engage in R&D. Isabella and Toke (2012) show that a grant-back provision increases  
the time to invention, using a matched data set of  longer by a matched data set of 
licensees and non-licensees1.  
 
A grant-back provision is often used in patent pools and today multinational 
companies often include this provision in license contracts. The governments of the 
United -tates, the European Union and Japan have published guidelines for  
grant-back provisions. However, their treatments of grant-back provisions differs. 
According to the “Antitrust Guidelines for licensing the intellectual property,” (p.26) 
issued by the U.-. Department of Justice and Fair Trade Commission in 1995,    
“An important factor in the Agencies' analysis of a grantback will be whether the 
licensor has market power in a relevant technology or innovation market. If the 
Agencies determine that a particular grantback provision is likely to reduce 
significantly licensees' incentives to invest in improving the licensed technology, the 
Agencies will consider the extent to which the grantback provision has offsetting 
procompetitive effects, such as (1) promoting dissemination of licensees' improvements 
to the licensed technology, (2) increasing the licensors' incentives to disseminate the 
licensed technology, or (3) otherwise increasing competition and output in a relevant 
technology or innovation market.” 
    In short, the U.-. guideline focuses on the market power of a technology or in an 
innovation market and the incentives of dissemination.   
 
On the other hand, in May 2014, the European Union revised its “Technology 
                                                  
1 They also show that when the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, a grant-back provision does not 
decrease the licensees’ incentives for R&D.  
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Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER),” which exempts licensing agreements 
concluded between companies that have limited market share2. All exclusive grant-back 
obligations3 and grant-backs between companies with high market power fall outside 
the safe harbor of TTBER in order to protect incentives to innovate and the appropriate 
application of intellectual property rights. The EU regulation focuses on market share.   
 
  In Japan, the guideline published by the Japan Fair Trade Commission states   
that a grant-back is basically “unfair,” because it gives monopolistic power to the 
licensor and reduces the licensees’ incentive for R&D. However, from this guideline 
allows an assign-back provision with an adequate assigned-price for the improved 
technology.  
 
In this way, the regulation of grant-backs varies among countries and the logic of 
the regulation is ambiguous. Many believe that it is a serious problem that 
multinational enterprises can request the broad technical scope of the grant-back from 
the patent holder of the improved technology. However, from a theoretical perspective it 
is not clear whether a grant-back increases investment in the original and the improved 
technology, or whether the licensor of the original technology has an incentive to expand 
the technical scope of the grant-back by as much as possible.    
 
This study uses game theory to examine the effects of an assign-back provision on 
the investment in R&D, considering the strategic behavior of firms. Then, we apply the 
conclusion to the guidelines published by the European Union, the United -tates and 
Japan. First, we construct a model of the assign-back and consider its effects on the 
investment in the original technology and that in the improved technology. In the model, 
we incorporate the technical scope of the grant-back, that is, the technical range within 
which to apply the assign-back. For simplicity, this is interpreted as the probability of 
applying the assign-back. The probability is high when most parts of the original 
technology are used to obtain the improved technology, or when the licensor of the 
original technology has high bargaining power and requests the assign-back, even 
though the improved technology is not derived from the original technology. Thus we 
consider two cases. In the first case, the technical scope of the grant-back is given as the 
characteristics of the technology, and in the second, the technical scope is chosen by the 
                                                  
2 For example, a market share not exceeding 20% for agreements between competitors, and 30% for agreements 
between non-competitors.  
3 Exclusive grant-back obligations are those where the licensee is obliged to license back to the licensor on an exclusive basis, and 
not cannot use its own improvements to the licensed technology 
 
 
4 
 
licensor of the original technology and committed to in the license contract before 
choosing the price of the assign-back.  
 
The proposed model is based on that of Hatanaka (2012a, b), who also introduced 
the technical scope of the grant-back and analyzed whether a grant-back increases 
investment. In that model, the technical scope and the price of the assign-back are 
chosen at the same time by the licensor.  The author concludes that only when the 
price of the assign-back is greater than the twice value of the royalties, does a 
grant-back increase the investment. However, the result is imperfect because the 
conclusion depends on the endogenous price of the assign-back.  
 
 In this study, taking into accounts of recent developments, we examine two cases. 
In the first case, the technical scope of the grant-back is given as the character of the 
technology.  In the second case, the licensor of the original technology who has 
significant power, is free to fix the technical scope of the grant-back, which is written 
and committed in the contract before the success of the improved technology.   
 
We obtain the following results. First, the government should not prohibit 
grant-backs, because they enhance the dissemination of the original technology.  A 
grant-back increases the licensor’s profit and provides the licensor with an incentive to 
sign a license contract. 
    -econd, when the technical scope is narrow, the licensee will accept zero as the 
price of the assign-back. An expansion of the technical scope decreases the investment 
in the improved technology, but increases that in the original technology, because it 
decreases the licensee's expected profit and the licensor can use the improved 
technology for free with a higher probability. However, when the technical scope of the 
grant-back is over a certain threshold level, the licensor must offer a positive price for 
the assign-back in order to have the licensee join the license contract. In this case, an 
expansion of the technical scope beyond this threshold decreases the investment of both 
firms in both technologies. In addition, we find that an increase in the price of the 
assign-back mitigates the negative effect on the investment in the improved technology.           
    Third, we examine the case in which the technical scope of the grant-back is chosen 
by the licensor and committed to in the license contract, before the price of the 
assign-back is chosen. The licensor of the original technology has no incentive to expand 
the technical scope of the grant-back by as much as possible, because an expansion of 
the technical scope beyond the threshold level decreases the investment in the improved 
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technology of both firms and leads to a reduction in the licensor’s profit.  
Fourth, we apply our results to the guidelines published by the European Union, 
the United -tates and Japan. We consider the validity of each of the guidelines. The 
guidelines of the European Union focus on the share of the product market, whereas  
those of the United -tates focus on the power in the technology market. The guidelines 
of Japan basically prohibit grant-backs, but allow assign-backs with a reasonable 
assigned price. We apply our theoretical results to these guidelines and consider their 
validity.  
 
Lerner, -trojwas, and Tirole (2007) examined cases in which grant-backs occur. 
They find that grant-backs should be associated with pools consisting of complements 
and allowing independent licensing. However, they do not obtain a desirable regulation 
for grant-backs and do not discriminate between an assign-back and free royalty 
provision. Choi (2002) examines the validity of grant-back clauses using the incomplete 
contract model. He finds that grant-back provisions can relax the incentive 
compatibility condition (ICC) for licensors and can make them transfer the best 
technology to the licensees. This result is the same as our first conclusion. In addition, 
he concludes that if a grant-back provision induces the transfer of the core technology, 
the grant-back clause enhances R&D, otherwise it may or may not have a positive effect  
on R&D.  He shows that if R&D tends to be duplicative, the effect of a grant-back 
clause is positive, because it can reduce excessive R&D. However, he does not consider 
the technical scope of the grant-back.  
 
 We also show the trade-off between investing in the original and the improved 
technology when the technical scope of the assign-back is narrow, as in studies on  
sequential innovation, such as -cotchmer (1991), Green and -cotchmer (1995) and 
Denicolo (2000). They show that strong protection of the original technology diminishes 
investment in the improved technology, and that the desirable patent breadth depends 
on which technology is more valuable.  In the same way, we conclude that the problem 
of the validity of an assign-back depends on the technical scope of the grant-back and on 
which technology is more valuable, assuming the technical scope of the grant-back is 
narrower than the threshold level.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
introduce the model used to analyze the assign-back and show the first-best 
investments. In section 3, we derive the equilibrium when the technical scope of the 
 
 
6 
 
grant-back is given. -ection 4 discusses the case when the technical scope of the 
grant-back is chosen by the licensor, and section 5 compares the free royalty provision 
and the assign-back. -ection 6 applies our results to the guidelines published by the 
European Union, the United -tates and Japan. The final section concludes the paper.     
 
 
2. The model  
2.1   The model of the assign-back  
There are two kinds of patentable technologies, namely, the original technology and 
the improved technology, which cannot be achieved without some parts of the original 
technology. The original technology reduces a unit cost of production from 0c   to 1c ,  
and the improved technology reduces the cost from 1c   to ,2c   where 0c > 1c > 2c . 
There exist two risk-neutral firms competing in terms of quantity in a product 
market and in R&D for these two technologies. We assume that only one firm can own 
the patent of each technology.  
The investment in the original technology by firm i  is denoted as iR )2,1( =i . 
Then, ),( jii RRΓ=γ  is the probability that firm i  obtains the patent of the original 
technology, depending on the investment of both firms, iR and jR . The probability of 
success of firm i  is increasing by its own investment, but decreasing by the rival’s 
investment, that is, 0
,
>Γ Rii , 0, <Γ Rji . In addition, we assume  0,,,, <Γ<Γ RjRiiRiRii   ( 2,1=i )ji ≠ . 
Because both of the firms may fail to achieve the technology, we can get 1<+ ji γγ .   
 
The investment in the improved technology by firm i  is denoted as iD )2,1( =i . 
Then ),( jii DDΘ=θ  is the probability that firm i  obtains the patent of the improved 
technology, depending on the investment of both firms, iD and jD . The probability of 
the success of the improved technology, ),( ji DDΘ  has the same characteristics as the 
probability of success of the original technology, that is, 1<+ ji θθ , 0, >Θ Dii , 0, <Θ Dji  and 
0
,,,,
<Θ<Θ DjDiiDiDii   ( ,21ori = )ji≠ . 
 
 We express Firm i ’s profit from the products without the royalty in a Cournot 
equilibrium when Firm i ’s cost is 
mc   and Firm j ’s cost is nc   (where ,2,1,0, =nm  ) 
as ),( nm ccpi . For simplicity, when both firms’ costs are equal at nc , each profit is 
denoted as )( ncpi .  
The royalties of the original technology and the improved technology are assumed 
to be given in the market as )2/10( << RR ff  and )2/10( << DD ff  of the profit of the 
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licensee4. Thus if Firm 1 succeeds in the original technology and signs the license 
contract with Firm 2, the profits of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are ))()1(),()1(( 11 cfcf RR pipi −+ . 
 
Now we explain the actions of each firm. At the first stage, each firm chooses its 
investment in the original technology. The firm that succeeds in the original 
technology is called as Firm 1 and the other firm is denoted as Firm 2.  
At the second stage, Firm 1 chooses whether to create a license contract for the 
original technology with Firm 2. If Firm 1 chooses not to create a license contract, it 
will engage in R&D of the improved technology by itself and obtain 
11 DMax=Π  ),()0,( 021 ccD piΘ 1011 ),())0,(1( DccD −Θ−+ pi .              
 
On the other hand, if Firm 1 chooses to create a license contract, Firm 1 can insert 
the grant-back condition. We consider an assign-back, which gives the licensor (Firm 1) 
the right to purchase the technology from the licensee (Firm 2) at the assigned price, if 
the licensee succeeds in obtaining the improved technology. Usually the grant-back 
includes a technical scope. If the licensee (Firm2) succeeds in the improved technology 
by utilizing the technology in the technical scope, the licensor (Firm 1) can purchase 
the patent of the improved technology. If the use of the original technology is not in this 
scope, Firm 1 cannot purchase it, and should pay the royalty for the improved 
technology to Firm 2. We express the technical scope as b  )10( ≤≤ b , which is the 
probability that the technology Firm 2 uses is in the technical scope. The technical 
scope of the assign-back is considered to be large, when the original technology is 
essential or when the licensor (Firm 1) has significant bargaining power.   
 
At the third stage, the licensor, Firm 1, offers the assigned price for the improved 
technology as S .  The licensee, Firm 2, chooses whether to accept the offer (take-it or 
leave-it offer). If Firm 2 rejects the assign-back, Firm 2 can no longer create license 
contracts related to the original technology and its unit cost is 0c . Thus, as long as 
Firm 2‘s expected profit in accepting the assign-back is larger than the profit it will earn 
without the license contract, Firm 2 will accept the offer of the assigned price. Firm 2’s 
profit without the license contract is  
 
),()}0,(1{),()0,( 1012012 ccDccD pipi Θ−+Θ=Π ,  
                                                  
4   An excessively high royalty is prohibited by the Antitrust Law and in general market sets the royalty at a 
reasonable level.  
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 where 
1D  is set to maximize the profit of Firm 1 without the license contract,  
)0,( 1DΘ ),( 02 ccpi 1011 ),())0,(1( DccD −Θ−+ pi . 
 
At the fourth stage, both firms choose their investment in the improved technology, 
),( 21 DD .  When Firm 1 succeeds in both technologies, the profits of Firm 1 and Firm 2 
are ))()1(),()1(( 22 cffcff DRDR pipi −−++  and this case occurs with probability, 1θ .  
 
The probability that Firm 2 succeeds in the improved technology, using the original 
technology in the technical scope of the assign-back, is b2θ .  In that case, Firm 1 
purchases the patent of the improved technology at price, S , and Firm 2 pays the 
royalty of both technologies to Firm 1. Therefore the profits of both firms are 
)))()1(,)()1(( 22 ScffScff DRDR +−−−++ pipi .   
     In the same way, the probability that Firm 2 succeeds in the improved technology, 
using the original technology outside the technical scope of the grant-back is )1(2 b−θ . 
The profits of both firms in that case are ))()1(),()1(( 22 cffcff DRDR pipi +−−+ . 
We assume that the total profit with a license is always higher than that without a 
license5. Thus, 
1221121221 )()1(2)()(2 Π+Π>−−−−++ DDcc piθθpiθθ  
is satisfied. In addition, we assume that they cannot include the level of investment in 
                                                  
5 We will focus on the case in which the license contracts increase the total profit of the firms, because when the 
license contracts do not do so, the license contracts will not be made.   
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the license contract, and the equilibrium concept we adopt is a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. The game tree is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
2.2 The first-best investment under the Cournot competition 
Because the expected social welfare after obtaining the original technology is  
21211212 )1)(())(( DDcWcW −−−−++ θθθθ ,  
where )( icW is the social welfare6 when each firm produces at ic  in the Cournot 
equilibrium, the first-order condition for the best investment in the improved 
technology under the Cournot competition is  
01))}(()({
,,12 =−Θ+Θ− DijDiicWcW       ( ji ≠ ).                     (1) 
The first-order condition for the first-best investment in the original technology 
under the Cournot competition is  
01)]()()}()(){)[(( 011221,, =−−+−+Γ+Γ cWcWcWcWRijRii θθ .                (2) 
 
 
 3. Equilibrium   
Now, we solve this game backward.  
At the fourth stage, both firms choose their investment for the improved technology, 
),( 21 DD , independently, given the technical scope of the assign-back provision, b , and 
the assigned price of the improved technology, S. The expected profit of Firm 1 is  
  
11 θ=Π )()1( 2cff DR pi++ + b2θ { Scff DR −++ )()1( 2pi } 
+ )1(2 b−θ )()1( 2cff DR pi−+ + )1( 21 θθ −− 11)()1( Dcf R −+ pi          
  
The first-order condition of 1D  is  
1,1 DΘ )()1{( 2cff DR pi++ )}()1( 1cf R pi+− bD1,2Θ+ })(2{ 2 Scf D −pi  
+ 1,2 DΘ −−+ )()1{( 2cff DR pi )}()1(  1cfR pi+ 01 =−            (3) 
                                                  
6 )( icW  consists of the profits of the two firms, )(2 icpi , and the consumer surplus when each firm produces 
the goods at ic  under the Cournot competition.  
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We rewrite equation (3) as 0),,( 21 =SDDF ，and from the assumption on the 
probability function, the second-order condition, 0/ 11 <=∂∂ DFDF , is satisfied.  
  
On the other hand, the expected profit of Firm 2 is  
12 θ=Π )()1( 2cff DR pi−− + b2θ { })()1( 2 Scff DR +−− pi  
+ )1(2 b−θ )()1( 2cff DR pi+− + )1( 21 θθ −− 21)()1( DcfR −− pi   
  
Therefore the first-order condition of 2D  is 
2,1 DΘ )()1{( 2cff DR pi−− )}()1( 1cfR pi−−  bD 2,2Θ− })(2{ 2 Scf D −pi   
2,2 DΘ+ −+− )()1{( 2cff DR pi )}()1(  1cfR pi− 01 =−  .          (4) 
  
We rewrite equation (4) as 0),,( 21 =SDDG ， and from the assumption on the 
probability function, the second-order condition,  0/ 22 <=∂∂ DGDG  is satisfied.  
 
  
Proposition 1.  
The investment in the improved technology in the equilibrium is smaller than the best 
investment under Cournot competition.  
 
Proof  
We can rewrite the equations (3) and (4) as follows,   
AD D1,111 / Θ=∂Π∂ BD1,2Θ+ 01 =−      (3’)  
})(2)(2{/ 122,122 AccD D −−Θ=∂Π∂ pipi })(2)(2{ 122,2 BccD −−Θ+ pipi 01 =−   ,        (4’) 
where  
)()1( 2cffA DR pi++= )()1( 1cf R pi+− ,  
−−++−= )()1(})(2{ 22 cffScfbB DRD pipi )()1(  1cf R pi+    . 
 
Comparing equations (3’)(4’) with  equation (1), from >− )()( 12 cWcW )}()({2 12 cc pipi − , 1D and 
2D , are smaller than the socially best option under Cournot competition.       Q.E.D.  
 
Under-investment in the improved technology occurs, because neither firm considers 
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the positive effect on the profit of the other firm when it succeeds, and that on 
consumers’ welfare. Therefore, an increase in the investment in the improved 
technology leads to an increase in the social welfare.   
 
 
 Lemma 1.  
From the assumption on the probability function, the firms’ investment in the 
technology， 1D and 2D , are strategic complements and the condition for the stability of 
the Nash equilibrium, 
21 / DD FF 21 / DD GG> , is satisfied.  
 
Proof  
The slope of the reaction function of Firm 1 is 2112 // DD FFdDdD −= . From the second-order 
condition, 1DF  is negative. From the assumption on the probability function, 02 >DF , 
we have 0/ 12 >dDdD , which denotes a strategic compliment. In the same way, the slope of 
the reaction function of Firm 2  is  0/ 12 >dDdD , because 1DG > 0.  The condition for the 
stability of the Nash equilibrium 
21 / DD FF 21 / DD GG>  is satisfied from the assumption on 
the probability function. (Q.E.D) 
 
When the investment in the improved technology, 1D and 2D , are strategic 
complements, the reaction functions are upward sloping, as drawn in Figure 2.  The 
investment in the improved technology in equilibrium can be expressed as )(*1 SD  
)(*2 SD , depending on S , which is the assigned price of the improved technology.   
      An increase in the price of the assign-back, S , shifts the reaction function of 
)(*1 SD rightward, because the partial differential of equation (1) by S  is 01,2 >Θ− bD . 
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Using the same logic, the reaction function of D2 shifts upward by an increase in the 
assign-back price. Therefore the equilibrium shifts from E to E’ by an increase in the 
price of the assign-back. Thus we obtain Proposition 2. 
 
 
Proposition 2  
An increase in the price of assign-back, S , increases the investment in the 
improved technology of both firms, that is, 0/)(*1 >dSSdD , and 0/)(*2 >dSSdD .   
 
Proof  
From the assumption, ,0 21 DD FF << 12 0 DD GG << , ,2,2 DS bG Θ=  and 01,2 >Θ−= DS bF , we 
have 
=
−
−
=
1221
221 )(*
DDDD
SDSD
GFGF
FGGF
dS
SdD
1221
1,222,22 )(
DDDD
DDDD
GFGF
GFb
−
Θ+Θ  .      
From the assumption of 02 >DF  and Lemma 1,  we have 01,222,22 >Θ+Θ DDDD GF  and 
0/)(*1 >dSSdD ．In the same way, 
1221
112 )(*
DDDD
SDSD
GFGF
GFFG
dS
SdD
−
−
= =
1221
2,211,21 )(
DDDD
DDDD
GFGF
FGb
−
Θ+Θ−
.
 
From the assumption of 01 >DG , we have 02,211,21 <Θ+Θ DDDD FG  and .0/)(*2 >dSSdD   Q.E.D.  
                                                  
 
Let us explain Proposition 2 intuitively. When the price of the assign-back, S , is 0,  
Firm 1 would like to have Firm 2 succeed in the improved technology, because Firm 1 
can use the improved the technology invented by Firm 2 for free. However, as the price 
of the assign-back increases, Firm 1 has more of an incentive to win the race in the 
improved technology in order to save the cost of the assign-back. Firm 2 also has more of 
an incentive to succeed in the improved technology by an increase in -.  
 
At the third stage, Firm 1 chooses the price of the assign-back, S , considering the 
following conditions. The maximization problem of Firm 1 is 
 SMAX  ),),(),(( 211 SSDSDΠ  
s.t. ≥Π )),(),(( 211 SSDSD NNN DccDccD 10210111 ),()0,(),()}0,(1{ −Θ+Θ−=Π pipi  (5) 
),()0,(),()}0,(1{)),(),(( 2011012122 ccDccDSSDSD NN pipi Θ+Θ−=Π≥Π ,     (6) 
where ND1  is 1D  to maximize 10210111 ),()0,(),()}0,(1{ DccDccD −Θ+Θ−=Π pipi .  
 
The first condition, equation (5), shows the incentive of Firm 1 to make the license 
contract with Firm 2. Firm 1 does not make the license contract, if the expected profit 
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with the assign-back is lower than the profit when it engages in the research for the 
improved technology by itself, 1Π . First, we assume that the first condition is satisfied, 
and then examine this condition later.    
 The second condition, equation (6), is to have Firm 2 participate in R&D for the 
improved technology. Firm 2 does not make the license contract, if its expected profit 
under the assign-back provision is lower than that without the license of the original 
technology.  
 
In Figure 3, we show the relationship between the price of the assign-back, S  , and 
Firm 2’s profit, given the technical scope of the grant-back, b . An increase in S  brings 
about an increase in the investment of the improved technology, which leads to an 
increase in Firm 2’s profit. When 0=b , the profit of Firm 2 under the assign-back is 
larger than that without the license contract, and the second condition is not binding. 
Therefore in this case, Firm 1 offers 0=S , which Firm 2 will accept. As b increases, 
the profit of Firm 2 decreases and the profit curve shifts downward, as shown in Figure 
3.  
Let us define b  to satisfy 
),()0,(),()}0,(1{)0),0(),0(( 2011012122 ccDccDDD NN pipi Θ+Θ−=Π=Π   
as 1b .  When 1bb = , Firm 2’ s profit is zero at 0=S , as shown in Figure 3. When b  
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becomes higher than 1b , say 'b , in Figure 3,  the second condition (equation (6)) 
becomes binding, and Firm 2 will reject the offer, which gives him less profit than that 
without the license contract. Thus, when 1bb > , Firm 1 cannot but offer 'S  enough to 
give Firm 2 as much profit as that without the license.  
   
Proposition 3 
    When 1211 ))()),(()),((( Π≥Π bSbSDbSD  is satisfied, that is, Firm 1 would like to 
make the license contract with Firm 2, the price of the assign-back in the equilibrium, 
*S , is , 
   If 1bb ≤ , 0*=S  
   If 1bb > , *S  is the solution of 
),()0,(),()}0,(1{*)*),(*),(( 2011012122 ccDccDSSDSD NN pipi Θ+Θ−=Π=Π   
and increases with b . 
  
Proof  -ee Appendix 1.  
 
Therefore, we can express the price of the assign-back chosen by Firm 1, given the 
technical scope of the assign-back, as )(bS . 
 
Then, we consider those cases in which 1b  is large. In other words, in what cases is 
Firm 2 more likely to accept 0=S ? 
 
When Firm 2’s profit without the license contract, 
),()0,(),()}0,(1{ 201101 ccDccD NN pipi Θ+Θ−  is relatively small, Firm 2 easily accepts zero as 
the price of assign-back.  In this case 1b  is large. In other words, when ),( 10 ccpi  and 
),( 20 ccpi  are small and )0,( 1 NDΘ is large, the price of the assign-back is likely to be 
zero. In other words, when the innovation sizes, ( )10 cc − and ( )20 cc − are large and Firm 
1 can easily get the improved technology by itself, Firm 2 cannot get positive price for 
the assign-back.  
 
Now, let us examine how the investments in the improved technology, 1D  and 2D , 
change with the technical scope, b . 
 
Proposition 4 
-uppose that 1211 ))()),(()),((( Π≥Π bSbSDbSD  is satisfied, that is, Firm 1 would like 
to make the license contract with Firm 2.  In this case, 1D and 2D   always decrease 
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with b . If 1bb > , this effect is weakened by the assigned price that increases with b .   
 
Proof  
The first-order condition for 1D  and 2D  can be rewritten as  
0)),(,,(
,21 =bbSDDF  and 0)),(,,( ,21 =bbSDDG  
From the total differential of F and G, we get  
 
1221
221 )()(*
DDDD
bbSDbbSD
GFGF
FSFGGSGF
db
dD
−
+−+
=
.  
In the same way, 
1221
112 )()(*
DDDD
bbSDbbSD
GFGF
GSGFFSFG
db
dD
−
+−+
=
. 
When ,1bb ≤  from 0=bS , ,0<< bb FG  ,02 >DF  01 >DG  and Lemma 1, we obtain 
0*
1221
221 <
−
−
=
DDDD
bDbD
GFGF
FGGF
db
dD  and 0*
1221
112 <
−
−
=
DDDD
bDbD
GFGF
GFFG
db
dD  
 
On the other hand, when ,1bb > we have  )/()/)(/(
})(2{
2112
22
SSDD
Scf
b
S D
∂Π∂+∂∂∂Π∂
−
=
∂
∂ piθ  
from Proposition 2.   
 From the proof of Proposition 2, 0/ 12 >∂Π∂ D , 0/1 >∂∂ SD , and bS 22 / θ=∂Π∂ , we 
get )/()/)(/( 2112 SSDD ∂Π∂+∂∂∂Π∂ b2θ> . Thus, bScfS Db /})(2{ 2 −< pi .  
From bG DS 2,2Θ=  and })(2{ 22,2 ScfG DDb −Θ−= pi , we get bbS GSG + <0.  
From bF DS 1,2Θ−=  and })(2{ 21,2 ScfF DDb −Θ= pi , we get .0<+ bbS FSF  
Thus, 0/1 <dbdD  and .0/,2 <dbdD         Q.E.D. 
 
Next, we discuss the implication of Proposition 4. When 1bb ≤ , the price of the 
assign-back, S , is zero.  An increase in b  means that at the higher probability, Firm 
1 can obtain the patent of the improved technology from Firm 2 for free. Thus, Firm 1 
has less of an incentive to invest in the improved technology by an increase in b . Firm 
2 also has less of an incentive, because a higher b  means that Firm 2 cannot earn a 
profit with a higher probability, even though it succeeds in the innovation of the 
improved technology.  
 
On the other hand, when 1bb > , Firm 2 can get S  by the assign-back and S is 
 
 
16 
 
increasing with b . By an increase in S , both Firm 1 and Firm 2 have more of an 
incentive to increase their investment in the improved technology, because Firm 1 
would like to decrease the probability of success of Firm 2 and Firm 2 would like to earn 
a profit from the improved technology, S , with a higher probability. Thus the negative 
effects of b  on investments are weakened by an increase in S .  
 
 
Proposition 5 
-uppose that 1211 ))()),(()),((( Π≥Π bSbSDbSD  is satisfied, that is, Firm 1 makes 
a license contract with Firm 2. In this case, if ,1bb ≤  1Π increases, but 2Π  decreases 
with b .  However when ,1bb >   2Π  is constant, but 1Π  decreases with b .  
 
Proof  -ee Appendix 2.  
 
     When 1bb ≤ , there are two effects of increases in b on each profit. First, the 
probability that Firm 1 can use Firm 2’s patent for free increases. Thus Firm 1’s profit 
increases, while that of Firm 2 decreases.  -econd, an increase in b brings about a 
decrease in the investment of each firm for the improved technology, iD , which brings 
about a decrease in the profit of each firm. Thus an increase in b means Firm 2’s profit 
always decreases, but Firm 1’s profit increases because the first effect is larger than the 
second effect.  We show the relationship between the technical scope of the grant-back, 
b , and the profit of each firm in Figure 4.  
 
When 1bb > , the profit of Firm 2 is constant at 2Π and there are three effects of an 
increase in b on Firm 1’s profit, including the two effects mentioned in the case of   
1bb ≤ .  The third effect occurs through the price of the assign-back.  From 
Proposition 4, when 1bb > , an increase in b causes an increase in the price of the 
assign-back, which leads to a decrease of Firm 1’s profit. Therefore, an increase in b  
decreases Firm 1’s profit.  
 
Next, we examine Firm 1’s incentive to make license contracts.  As stated in  
Proposition 5, if ,1bb ≤  1Π increases with b , but if ,1bb >  1Π  decreases with b . 
When b=1, Firm 2’s profit is equal to 2Π . From the assumption that the license 
contract always increases the total profit of Firm 1 and Firm 2, Firm 1’s profit when 
b=1 is larger than 1Π . Thus, we obtain Proposition 6.  
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
Proposition 6 
If Firm 1’s profit in equilibrium when 0=b  is higher than 1Π , Firm 1 always 
makes a license contract with Firm 2.  Otherwise, Firm 1 makes a license contract with 
Firm 2  if ,0bb ≥  where  0b is b satisfying 
 =Π )),()),(()),((( 211 bbSbSDbSD =Π 1 NNN DccDccD 1021011 ),()0,(),()}0,(1{ −Θ+Θ− pipi . 
 
 
Then, in which cases is 0b  large ?  Here, large 0b  means that Firm 1’s profit 
from engaging in the innovation of the improved technology,  
NNN DccDccD 1021011 ),()0,(),()}0,(1{ −Θ+Θ− pipi , is large. Thus when the sizes of the 
innovation, ( )10 cc − and ( )20 cc − are large and the probability of Firm 1’s success in the 
improved technology by himself is high, 0b  is large, that is, Firm 1 is less likely to 
make a license contract with Firm 2.  
Next, we consider the first stage, namely, the choice of the investment for the original 
technology, iR  and jR .  The expected profit of Firm i is  
Ω = ),( ji RRΓ 1Π + 2),( ΠΓ ij RR + )},(),(1{ ijji RRRR Γ−Γ− iRcc −),( 00pi  
The first-order condition is  
01)),((,)),(( 002001, =−−ΠΓ+−ΠΓ cccc RijRii pipi  
Therefore, as the profit when the firm succeeds in the original technology, 1Π ,  
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increases and 2Π  decreases, the investment in the original technology increases.  
 
 
Proposition 7 
Assume that Firm 1 makes a license contract with Firm 2, that is, Firm 1’s profit 
when 0=b  is higher than 1Π  or 0bb ≥ . When ,)( 1bb >≤ the investment in the 
original technology, R , increases (decreases) with b . 
 
Proof  
From Proposition 6, when 1bb ≤ , 1Π  is increasing and 2Π  is decreasing  with b . 
Thus the investment in the original technology increases with b .  When ,1bb >   1Π  
is decreasing and 2Π  is constant. Thus, the investment in the original technology 
always decreases with b . Q.E.D.    
 
From Proposition 4, the investment in the improved technology decreases with an 
expansion of the technical scope of the grant-back. Therefore when ,1bb ≤  by an 
expansion of the technical scope of the grant-back, there is a trade-off between the 
investment in the improved technology and that in the original technology. On the other 
hand, when ,1bb >  both investments decrease by an expansion of the technical scope 
of the assign-back. Thus, we can conclude that the government should regulate an  
assign-back, when the technical scope of the assign-back is broad.  
 
 
4.  The technical scope chosen by the licensor  
In the previous sections, the technical scope of the assign-back was assumed to be 
given as the characteristic of each technology. In this section, we change this 
assumption. Now, we assume that the technical scope of the assign-back is chosen by 
the licensor of the original technology at the timing of the license contract of the original 
technology at the second stage. After the licensor commits the technical scope of the 
assign-back, he offers a price for the assign-back. By this change of the assumption, we 
can analyze whether the licensor of the original technology would like to expand the 
technical scope of the assign-back by as much as possible.  
 
 
Proposition 8 
When Firm 1 can choose the technical scope of the assign-back at the second stage, 
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Firm 1 always makes a license contract with Firm 2 and sets 1b as the technical scope of 
the assign-back.   
 
Proof  
Because Firm 1’s profit in the equilibrium when 1bb =  is higher than 1Π , Firm 1 
always makes a license contract with Firm 2, and offers 1b  to maximize Firm 1’s profit.                                                                   
                                                                   Q.E.D. 
 
 
    We find that Firm 1 has no incentive to expand the technical scope of the 
assign-back because a broader technical scope than 1b decreases the investment by both 
firms in the improved technology and decreases Firm 1’s profit.     
 
 
Proposition 9 
The investment in the original technology always increases by allowing an 
assign-back, when Firm 1 can choose the technical scope of the assign-back at the 
second stage. 
  
Proof  
 Prohibiting an assign-back means 0=b .  Because the profit of Firm 1 in the case 
of 1bb = is larger than that in the case of 0=b , and the profit of Firm 2 in the case of 
1bb =  is smaller than that in the case of 0=b , from Proposition 5, the investment in 
the original technology when 1bb =  is higher than that when 0=b .  
                                                 Q.E.D. 
 
 
5. A Comparison between the assign-back and the free royalty 
provision  
 
Our analysis can be applied easily to the case of a free royalty provision, where 
Firm 1 need not pay the royalty for the improved technology to Firm 2. Under the free 
royalty provision, when Firm 2 succeeds in the improved technology, using the original 
technology in the technical scope of the grant-back, Firm 1’s profit is 
),()1( 22 ccf R pi+ and Firm 2’s profit is ),()1( 22 ccf R pi− .  Without the free royalty 
provision, Firm 1’s profit is ),()1( 22 ccff DR pi−+  and Firm 2’s profit is 
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),()1( 22 ccff DR pi+− . 
 
To compare the effects on the investment in the improved technology between the 
assign-back and the free royalty provision, we compare the profit of each firm when 
Firm 2 succeeds in the improved technology, using the original technology in the 
technical scope for the cases of  “without grant-back,” “free royalty provision,” 
“assign-back when ,” and “assign-back when ” in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The profits of Firm 1 and Firm 2 when Firm 2 succeeds in the improved, 
using the original technology in the technical scope 
 Firm 1’s profit Firm 2’s profit 
without grant-back )()1( 2cff DR pi−+  )()1( 2cff DR pi+−  
free royalty provision  )()1( 2cf R pi+  )()1( 2cfR pi−  
assign-back when  )()1( 2cff DR pi++  )()1( 2cff DR pi−−  
assign-back when ,1bb > 0>S  Scff DR −++ )()1( 2pi  Scff DR +−− )()1( 2pi  
   
 From the previous analysis, the smaller Firm 2’s profit in the Table 1 becomes, the 
less Firm 2 has an incentive to invest in the improved technology. In addition, the larger 
Firm 1’s profit in the Table 1 becomes, the less Firm 1 has an incentive to invest in the 
improved technology.   
 
First, consider the sizes of the investment in the improved technology. When b , 
the technical scope of the grant-back, is small enough to make Scf D ≥)( 2pi , the 
investment by both firms in the improved technology is small in ascending order of 
“assign-back,” “free royalty provision,” and “without grant-back.”   
On the other hand, when the technical scope of the grant-back is large enough to 
satisfy )(2)( 22 cfScf DD pipi ≤< 7 , the investment by each firm in the improved 
technology is small in the order of “free royalty provision,” “assign-back,” and “without 
grant-back.”  
   
Next, we focus on the size of the investment in the original technology. As denoted 
in Proposition 7, in the case of the assign-back, as long as ,1bb ≤ the investment in the 
original technology, R , increases with b . However, if ,1bb > the investment in the 
                                                  
7 The patent holder of the original technology would not like to put in the assign-back 
condition if . Thus,   is always satisfied.   
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original technology decreases with b . On the other hand, in the case of the free royalty 
provision, the investment in the original technology, R , continues to increase, as long 
as Firm 2 accepts the free royalty provision.  If b  gets too large, Firm 2 would not like 
to accept the free royalty provision. -o we cannot compare the size of the investment in 
the original technology between the assign-back and the free royalty provision.  
 
The other difference between the free royalty provision and the assign-back is as 
follows. First, let us compare the size of 0b  between the assign-back and the free 
royalty provision, 0b , is the technical scope, at which point, Firm 1 starts to make a 
license with Firm 2.  In other words, when 0bb < , Firm 1 engages in R&D for the 
improved technology by itself.  Firm 1’s profit with the free royalty provision is lower 
than that with the assign-back, because with the assign-back Firm 1 can obtain the 
property right of the improved technology for free. Thus, 0b  under the free royalty 
provision is larger than that under the assign-back. In other words, Firm 1 with the free 
royalty provision is more reluctant to make a license contract than in the case of the 
assign-back. In this sense, the assign-back enhances dissemination more than the free 
royalty provision does.  
 
-econd, under the free royalty provision, if the technical scope of the grant-back, b , 
is sufficiently broad, Firm 2 may reject the license contract with free royalty provision. 
In that case, only Firm 1 invests in the improved technology, which is not socially 
desirable. However, under the assign-back, if the technical scope of the grant-back, b , 
is broad, Firm 1 offers a sufficiently high price for the assign-back to guarantee the 
profit without the license contract to Firm 2. Thus, Firm 2 would like to make a license 
contract and invest in the improved technology. In this sense, the assign-back enhances 
the dissemination more than the free royalty provision does.    
 
6. Analysis of the guidelines published by the European Union, 
the United -tates, and Japan 
The guideline of Japan prohibits the grant-back in principle but an assign-back 
with an adequate assigned price is permitted. The European Union regulates  
grant-backs when the licensor of the original technology has a high market share in the 
product markets, and the United -tates focuseson the power in a relevant technology 
market and the incentive for innovation. In this section, we examine the significance of 
each regulation.   
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Before analyzing each regulation, we consider whether the government should 
prohibit all of the assign-backs. The situation in which the government prohibits all of 
the assign-backs corresponds to the case of 0=b .  When Firm 1’s expected profit 
without the license contract is relatively high, that is, when 00 >b , Firm 1 chooses to 
engage in R&D for the improved technology itself, rather than making license contracts, 
if the government prohibits all assign-backs and sets 0=b .  Thus, the prohibition of 
an assign-back and a grant-back may lead to Firm 1’s non-disclosure and non-license of 
the original technology. Therefore, the prohibition of all grant-backs is not desirable.  
     
According to the EU guideline, grant-backs between companies with high market 
power are prohibited. In other words, even if a grant-back decreases the incentive for 
innovation of the improved technology, it is permitted when the licensor and the 
licensee have a low market share. Even though the grant-back may create some loss in 
the market of the technology, the European Union focuses on the loss in the product 
market. The market of the technology should be distinguished from that of the products. 
In order to decrease the dead weight loss in the product market, the government should 
regulate the monopolistic action in the product market. However, to measure the loss in 
the technology market, the government should check the level of the investments. In 
that sense, the U- regulation is desirable.   
 
    The U- commission focuses on the case in which the licensor has high bargaining 
power in the technology market, because this licensor can expand the technical scope 
and raise the price of the assign-back. However, if a licensor with high bargaining power 
tries to expand the scope, many licensees will start decreasing their investment in the 
improved technology, which leads to a reduction in the profit of the licensor. If the 
technical scope of the grant-back is too broad, the innovator of the improved technology 
may quit the license contract. Thus, the licensor has an incentive not to expand the 
technical scope. Thus, the U.-. Commission need not be worried about the expansion of 
the technical scope of the grant-back by the licensor.  
 
The regulation of Japan permits a grant-back where the price of the assign-back is 
sufficiently high. According to our results, an increase in the price of the assign-back 
increases investment in the improved technology, but it decreases investment in the 
original technology.  Thus, if the government finds a serious reduction in the 
investment in the improved technology, and the improved technology contributes to 
increasing social welfare, the government should encourage the patent holder to 
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purchase the patent of the improved technology at the sufficiently high price. However, 
this guidance will decrease the investment in the original technology. There is a 
trade-off between investment in the improved technology and that in the original 
technology.  Thus, the government should judge which technology is more valuable to 
society in each case.  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
We examined the effects of an assign-back and free royalty provision on 
investments in the original technology and the improved technology using the game 
theoretic model, considering the technical scope of the assign-back, that is, the technical 
scope to apply the assign-back.  This is high when most parts of the original technology 
are used to obtain the improved technology or when the licensor of the original 
technology has high bargaining power and requests the assign-back, even though the 
improved technology is not derived from the original technology.  
We examined two cases. First, the technical scope of the assign-back is given as the 
characteristics of the technology and second, it is chosen and committed to by the patent 
holder of the original technology. In addition, we compared the effect of an assign-back 
with that of the free royalty provision, and analyzed the guidelines for grant-backs 
published by the European Union, the United -tates and Japan theoretically. As a 
result, we obtain the following five conclusions.  
     
First, the government should not prohibit grant-backs, because these enhance the 
dissemination of the original technology.  By the grant-back, the licensor’s profit with 
the license contract increases and the licensor has an incentive to make a license 
contract. 
    -econd, we clarified the effects of an expansion of the technical scope of the 
assign-back, which we express as the probability that the improved technology is 
applied to the assign-back. When the technical scope is small, the licensee will accept 
zero as the offer of the price of the assign-back. By expanding the technical scope, the 
investment in the improved technology decreases, but that in the original technology 
increases, because an expansion of the technical scope of the assign-back decreases the 
expected profit of the licensee, and the licensor can use the improved technology for free 
with a higher probability. However, when the technical scope of the grant-back is over a 
certain threshold level, the licensor must offer a positive price of the assign-back in 
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order to have the licensee join in the license contract. In this case, an expansion of the 
technical scope decreases the investments of both firms in both technologies. Thus, the 
government should regulate an assign-back, when the technical scope of the assign-back 
is broad. In addition, an increase in the price of the assign-back mitigates the negative 
effects on the investment for the improved technology.   
     
Third, we examined the case in which the technical scope of the grant-back is 
chosen by the licensor. The licensor of the original technology does not have an incentive 
to expand the technical scope of the grant-back as much as possible, because expanding 
the technical scope over the threshold level decreases the investment in the improved 
technology by both firms and reduces the licensor’s profit. 
 
Fourth, we compared the assign-back with the free royalty provision. As in the 
case of the free royalty provision, the expansion of the technical scope of the grant-back 
decreases investment in the improved technology, but increases that in the original 
technology. The main difference between the assign-back and the free royalty provision 
is that the assign-back enhances the dissemination more than the free royalty provision 
does. There are two reasons of this result. First, when the technical scope is small, the 
assign-back gives the licensor a greater incentive to make a license contract, because 
the assign-back gives the licensor a higher expected profit than the free royalty 
provision does. The second reason is that when the technical scope is large, the 
assign-back gives the licensee a greater incentive to join the license contract by raising 
the price of the assign-back.  
 
Fifth, we discussed the guidelines published by the European Union, the United 
-tates, and Japan. The guideline of Japan basically prohibits grant-backs but permits 
assign-backs with a fair price. According to our result, prohibiting all grant-backs is not 
desirable and the assign-back with the fair price mitigates the problems with 
grant-backs, that is, a decrease the investment in the improved technology. The EU 
guideline prohibits a grant-back between companies with high market power in the 
product market. Even if the grant-back may create some losses in the market of the 
technology, such as a decrease in investment, the EU guideline focuses on the loss in the 
product market only. The market of the technology should be distinguished from that of 
the products. In order to decrease the dead-weight loss in the product market, the 
government should regulate the monopolistic action in the product market. However, to 
measure the loss in the technology market, the government should also check the level 
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of the investments. In that sense, the U- regulation is desirable.   
 
    As noted earlier, the U- Commission focuses on the case in which the licensor has  
high power in the technology market, because this licensor with the high power can 
expand the technical scope and raise the price of the assign-back. However, according to 
our result, the licensor does not have an incentive to expand the technical scope as 
much as possible, because the expansion will decrease the licensor’s profit, too.   
 
Note that we do not examine cases in which there are multiple licensees. However, 
in that case, we can expect similar conclusions.   
 
 
     
Appendix 1 
-olving this problem by using a Lagrangian, from 0/ 11 =∂Π∂ D , we get  
 )],()0,(),()}0,(1{)),(),(([
)),(),((
201101122
211
ccDccDSSDSD
SSDSDL
NN pipiλ Θ−Θ−−Π+
Π=
 
=∂∂ SL / )/( 21 D∂Π∂ 0}/)/)(/{(/)/( 211212 =∂Π∂+∂Π∂+∂Π∂+ SdSdDDSdSdD λ                                        
)],()0,(),()}0,(1{)),(),(([ 201101122 ccDccDSSDSD NN pipiλ Θ−Θ−−Π =0.  
 In order to get the sign of ji D∂Π∂ / , we rewrite equations (3) and (4) into  
1,1 DΘ A+ BD1,2Θ 1=    and ED2,1Θ + 12,2 =Θ FD  ,  
where  A+E=B+F=2 )}()({ 12 cc pipi − .   Thus we have  
ji D∂Π∂ / = AD2,1Θ + BD2,2Θ  
= ]))}()((2[{ 122,1 EccD −−Θ pipi + ]))}()((2[{ 122,2 FccD −−Θ pipi  
= )}()({2 12 cc pipi − 1)( 2,22,1 −Θ+Θ DD >0. 
From  0/ >∂∂ SDi  and 0// 221 <−=∂Π−∂=∂Π∂ bSS θ , the equilibrium is  
(I) -*=0, 0=λ  
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0),()0,(),()}0,(1{)0),0(),0(( 201101122 >Θ−Θ−−Π ccDccDDD NN pipi  
0),()0,(),()}0,(1{)0),0(),0(( 1021011211 ≥+Θ−Θ−−Π NNN DccDccDDD pipi  
(II) 0*>S , ,0>λ   
0),()0,(),()}0,(1{*)*),(*),(( 201101122 =Θ−Θ−−Π ccDccDSSDSD NN pipi  
0),()0,(),()}0,(1{*)*),(*),(( 1021011211 ≥+Θ−Θ−−Π NNN DccDccDSSDSD pipi
=λ
bdSdDD
bdSdDD
2112
2221
)/)(/(
)/)(/(
θ
θ
+∂Π∂
−∂Π∂
−
 
 
When ,0=b   λ  is negative and equation (6), that is, the condition such that Firm 2 
will invest for the improved technology is not binding. Thus equilibrium (I) is obtained. 
When 1bb > , equation (6) becomes binding and equilibrium (II) is obtained.  
 
Next, we show the price of the assign back is increasing with b in the equilibrium II, 
where ->0 and 2Π is constant.  From  
)/)(/)(/(/ 2222 dbdSdSdDDdbd ∂Π∂=Π + )/)(/)(/( 112 dbdSdSdDD∂Π∂
)/)(/( 2 dbdSS∂Π∂+       0)/( 2 =∂Π∂+ b  and 22 / D∂Π∂ 0=  
 
we get 
)/)(/)(/( 112 dbdSdSdDD∂Π∂ )/)(/( 2 dbdSS∂Π∂+ = b∂Π∂− /2  
= .0))(2( 22 >− Scf Dpiθ From ,0)/()/)(/( 2112 >∂Π∂+∂Π∂ SdSdDD  we get  0>db
dS
.         
Q.E.D. 
 
 
Appendix 2  
)/)(/(/ 2211 dbdDDdbd ∂Π∂=Π )/()/)(/( 11 bdbdSS ∂Π∂+∂Π∂+  
)/)(/(/ 1122 dbdDDdbd ∂Π∂=Π )/()/)(/( 22 bdbdSS ∂Π∂+∂Π∂+  
 
When 1bb ≤ , 0=S , and 0/ =∂∂ bS . We obtain 0/1 <dbdD  and 0/2 <dbdD  from 
Proposition 3. From b∂Π∂ /1 = })(2{/ 222 Scfb D −=∂Π∂− piθ , we get  
0)/()/)(/(/ 21122 <∂Π∂+∂Π∂=Π bdbdDDdbd  
)/()/)(/(/ 12211 bdbdDDdbd ∂Π∂+∂Π∂=Π  
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1221
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2
1 Scf
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GFFG
D DDDDD
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−
∂
Π∂
= piθ .  
 
From 0)/()/)(/(/ 1221 <∂Π∂+∂∂∂Π∂=∂∂ SSDDSL  and Appendix 1,  
. 
From the proof of Proposition 5,  
we get )/)(/( 221 dbdDD∂Π∂ > )(
)(
2,21!1,21
112
DDDD
bDbD
FG
GFFG
Θ+Θ
−
−
θ
. 
From })(2{/ 21,2 ScfbF DD −Θ=∂∂ pi and },)(2{/ 22.2 ScfbG DD −Θ−=∂∂ pi  we obtain 
 >
Π
db
d 1
)(
)(
2,211,21
112
DDDD
bDbD
FG
GFFG
Θ+Θ
−
−
θ })(2{ 22 Scf D −+ piθ =0. 
 
On the other hand when 0>S  and ,1bb >  2Π  is constant. However, 1Π  changes 
with b , that is,  
bbSSdbdDDdbd ∂Π∂+∂∂∂Π∂+∂Π∂=Π /)/)(/()/)(/(/ 112211  
= )/)(/( 221 dbdDD∂Π∂ })(2{)/( 222 ScfbSb D −+∂∂− piθθ . 
   F 
From 0/ =∂∂ SL , 0>λ , and 0)/()/)(/( 1221 >∂Π∂+∂∂∂Π∂ SSDD , we get 
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           Q.E.D.  
 
 
)(
)(
/
/0
2,211,21
12212
2
1
2
1
DDDD
DDDD
FG
GFGF
SD
S
D Θ+Θ
−
−=
∂∂
∂Π∂
−<
∂
Π∂
<
θ
 
 
28 
 
 
References  
Choi Jay Pil (2002) “A Dynamic Analysis Of Licensing: The “Boomerang” Effect And 
Grantback Clauses” International Economic Review Vol.43 No.3 August pp.803-829. 
 
Denicolo Vincenzo (2000) “Two--tage Patent Races and Patent Policy”, The RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol.31, No.3 Autumn pp.488-501. 
 
European Commission (2014) ”Antitrust: Commission adopts revised competition 
regime for technology transfer agreements – frequently asked questions” in European 
Commission Press Release Database     
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release0MEMO-14-2080en.htm(3/25/2017). 
 
Green, J. and -. -cotchmer (1995) “On the Division of Profit in -equential Innovation” 
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.26, No.1 -pring pp.20-33. 
  
Hatanaka, K. (2012a) “Economic Analysis of Grant-back Condition”  (in Japanese) 
Competition policy research center, Discussion Paper -eries,  56-J. 
 
Hatanaka K (2012b)  “-hould Grant-Back Provision In License Contract Be 
Prohibited?” Conference Proceedings of Advances In Business-Related -cientific 
Research Conference. 
 
Japan Fair Trade Commision (2007) “Antitrust Guidelines for licensing the intellectual property”  
(in Japanese)  http://www.jftc.go.jp/dk/guideline/unyoukijun/chitekizaisan.html 
 
Lerner, Strojwas and Tirole (2007) “The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing 
Rules” RAND Journal of Economics Vol.38, No.3 pp.610-625. 
 
Leone Maria Isabella and Reichstein Toke (2012) ”Licensing-in Fosters Rapid Invention! The Effect 
of the Grant-back Clause and Technological Unfamiliarity” Strategic Management Journal Vol.33 
pp.965-985. 
. 
Scotchmer (1991) ”Standing on the shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.5, No.1, pp.29-41 
  
 
 
29 
 
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1995)  
“Antitrust Guidelines for licensing the intellectual property” 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/archived-1995-antitrust-guidelines-licensing-intellectual-property 
(03/25/2017). 
